The CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT) weren't an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.

While subjected to EIT, CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. Detainees provided fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including terrorist threats that the CIA identified as its highest priorities.

The CIA's justification for the use of its EIT rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness. The committee reviewed 20 frequent examples of purported counter-terrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to EIT, and found them to be fundamentally wrong. There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the "effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA. Nor did the reviews seek to confirm whether the intelligence cited by the CIA as being obtained "as a result" of EIT was unique and "otherwise unavailable."

The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented. Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. CIA records describe waterboarding as a "series of near drownings." The CIA routinely subjected detainees to nudity and dietary manipulation and used abdominal slaps and cold water dousing. None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice (DoJ), and at least 17 detainees were subjected to EIT without authorization from CIA headquarters. Although these incidents were recorded in cables and, in some cases deemed inappropriate by supervisors, corrective action was rarely taken. CIA officers and contractors who violated policies or performed poorly were rarely held accountable.

The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the DoJ, impeding a legal analysis of the Detention and Interrogation Program (DIP).The DoJ didn't conduct independent analysis or verification of the information it received from the CIA. The department warned, however, that if the facts provided by the CIA were to change, its legal conclusions might not apply. When the CIA determined that information it had provided to the DoJ was incorrect, the CIA rarely informed the department. The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information, and this prevented a complete understanding by executive officials, impeding oversight.

The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior CIA officials coordinated to share classified information on the DIP to select members of the media to counter public criticism, shape public opinion, and avoid potential congressional action to restrict the CIA's DIP. Much of the information the CIA provided to the media on the operation of the CIA's DIP and the effectiveness of its EIT was inaccurate and was similar to the inaccurate information provided by the CIA to Congress, DoJ, and White House.

DIP was inherently unsustainable and had effectively ended by 2006. It damaged the United States' standing in the world, and resulted in monetary and non-monetary costs.

Chip Tuthill lives in Mancos. Website used: http://www.feinstein.senate.gov